A man in a hut high above the North Wales coast points his telescope towards a similar hut 15 km to the west. He suddenly sees an array of shapes being hoisted up a mast above the hut. He notes the shapes and the angles of their display and creates the same array on the mast above his hut. And 15 km to the east someone is carefully watching and will repeat the display. This is the 1820s and the Holyhead telegraph -across eight stations the message of an approaching ship in the Irish Sea will be sent 160 km within ten minutes to ship owners, port authorities, traders and insurers in Liverpool who will have hours of notice of the arrival of a vessel in port.
It's a neat example of semiotics, the creation of symbols with meaning unassociated with their physical structure, and a novel optical communication system.
The telegraph did not last long, with the advent of electricity, but neatly illustrates the subject of semiotics, which has got ever more complex and significant as human society and communications have developed.
The signs that constitute the raw material of semiotics are not only words but gestures, sounds, objects, images or anything that represents or stands for something else. Semiotics, which is not so much a discipline as a collection of analytical tools, has a following among theorists working in the arts, media, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and other branches of learning.
Whether the sign in question is part of an advertisement or a novel, a picture or a piece of music, the semiotician's underlying assumptions are broadly similar: that meaning is not a fixed inherent property of the sign, but something read into it. Unless it is actively decoded, we may fail to understand the conscious or inadvertent intentions of its creator.
Over recent years, as with many areas of human activity, some biologists have taken an interest in the possible evolutionary origin of semiotics. One researcher who had a long-standing interest
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There is growing interest in the precise role of information within biological systems and some biologists are looking to learn from semiotics. Nigel Williams reports. word 'cow' refers to a particular farm animal. But there is nothing in the sound of 'cow' that makes this meaning necessary -it could equally well mean a mountain or an article of clothing," he pointed out. "A few words are not symbolic -'cuckoo' for instance." But the meaning of most words is conventional, he argued. "The same is true of genetic signals. The small-eye gene in the mouse means 'make an eye here' but, as far as its form is concerned, it could equally well mean 'make a whisker' or 'don't make a toe'".
Signs of the times
Maynard Smith highlighted the work of french biologist Jacques Monod, and his book Chance and Necessity.
"Although Monod does not draw an explicit analogy between regulatory genes and the 'symbols' of the semioticians, the idea is implicit in his discussion," says Maynard Smith. "He points out that although gene regulation necessarily depends on chemical reactions, there is no chemical necessity about which molecular signal induces which result. He calls the property 'gratuity', a term that is more apt in French than in English. It arises because a molecule that binds to one region on the surface of a protein can alter the overall shape of the protein. Hence natural selection can 'design' proteins that respond to the presence of a signal by altering their activity in any required way." "This symbolic character of a signalling system is crucial, whether in the genetic code, in the control of development, or in human language. Only a symbolic system can convey an indefinitely large number of messages," he says.
Interest in these ideas has been growing amongst at least a small group of researchers. Jasper Hoffmeyer, at the University of Copenhagen's Institute of Molecular Biology says: "The biosemiotic way of looking at things marks a break with the old division of the world into the natural and the cultural," he says. "The way it does this is by showing that the reality of signs is not exclusively of the human sphere. Signs grew in evolution.
All living things can be understood as semiotic systems."
The general argument is that biological entities do not interact like mechanical bodies, but rather as messages. And biological information, adds Hoffmeyer, is inseparable from its context. It has to be interpreted to achieve anything.
From the display of a male peacock to the flower pattern that guides an insect towards its nectar, the natural world is rich in signs through which animals and plants communicate. But biosemiotics aims to go deeper than this. Marcello Barbieri, professor of embryology at the University of Ferrara and editor of the recently published Introduction to Biosemiotics is among those scientists who are applying this analysis at the level of cells and molecules.
The emphasis now is on information: how it is coded in genes; how it is utilised to create and control cells, how it is copied and passed to subsequent generations. But most biologists know little or nothing of semiotics, let alone its application to their discipline, and many remain sceptical.
Writing in the Introduction to Biosemiotics, Donald Favareau, at the National University of Singapore, notes that Francis Crick, in his 'central dogma' of genetic inheritance, considered 'information' synonymous with the "sequence of amino acid residues", while Claude Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of 'communication across a channel' explicitly denies that the 'information' that they are talking about 'means' anything in the sense that we associate with the word 'meaning'.
"If biosemiotics has any one single most constructive message to give to the mainstream science community, surely it is precisely this: a semiotic process is not a ghostly, mental, human thought process. Rather, it is, in the first instance, nothing more nor less mysterious than that natural interface by which an organism actively negotiates the present demands of the organization of its external surround." Geneticist Conrad Hall Waddington held a series of conferences entitled 'Towards a Theoretical Biology' each year from 1966-1969 and attracted such participants as Lewis Wolpert, Brian Goodwin, R.C. Lewontin, David Bohm, Rene Thom and Ernst Mayr. Yet while all these participants undoubtedly both contributed to, as well as came from, these conferences with an enriched notion of the phenomenon of 'self-organisation' in complex systems, these conferences did not result in the creation of any one coherently ongoing 'group' or specifically focused collective agenda, such as can be found in the current project of biosemiotics, writes Favareau.
The field now has a lively annual meeting. The interdisciplinary research interests and data presented at the annual International Gatherings in Biosemiotics, are "all of which, in one way or another, devoted to the central question of the nonmystical role of 'representation' and its 'meaning' in the organization and interactions of living organisms", writes Favareau.
But the field still has its sceptics within biology and beyond. The members of the field still have to devote considerable time responding to uninformed criticism. "No, it's not sociobiology; no, it isn't spiritualist or vitalist; no, we don't think that an amoeba has thoughts...," writes Favareau.
"What is being asked for is not a retreat into mysticism, supernaturalism, immaterialism, or reification of some scientifically unexaminable thing or element called the 'sign' per se -but, rather, the same type of rigorous, repeatable, falsifiable examinations into a set of naturally occurring relations in the world that living beings ... need." "Because we believe no events at tea parties, in genes, or in enzymes violate any physical laws we might assume that their descriptions differ only in degrees of complexity. What biosemiotics illustrates is that symbolic controls are categorically different from laws and that they are irreducible to physical laws even though their material vehicles obey the laws and have a correct physical description," writes H. Pattee, at the State University of New York.
But despite such statements there is no doubt the field has a lot of ground to cover to avoid inventing new and sometimes unnecessary words or using the same words to mean different things, and redescribing the familiar for no obvious reason. The Introduction to Biosemiotics is not an easy read so there is a long way to go before most mainstream biologists can even begin to assess Barbieri's claim that the "basic unit of life is the sign, not the molecule".
The Holyhead telegraph is altogether a more comprehensible system.
While some biologists are exploring whether semiotics can be a useful tool for looking at interactions amongst biological entities as far down as the cellular and molecular level, there has been a long-standing curiosity about the extent to which our closest relatives, the apes and monkeys, are able to grasp the concept of the symbol -an object that represents something else with no physical connection. Language is perhaps the human triumph, not only can we recognise the symbolic meaning of words, spoken or written, but we also have a grammar to manipulate those symbols into statements of almost unlimited complexity.
The human ability to learn the meaning of symbols outside language is hugely impressive too.
But the history of experiments to assess our relatives' abilities have often been controversial: it's hard to devise a watertight experimental system, especially if only one or a few animals are involved (as has often has been the case). And there is no doubt individuals can vary substantially, as in humans, in their cognitive skills.
But the cumulative evidence suggests that the recognition of symbols is not a human exclusive and a recent paper adds to the belief that at least some monkeys within a group tested can use symbols to their advantage.
Elsa Addessi and colleagues at the Institute of Cognitive Researchers are engaged on the tough task of determining how apes and monkeys can use symbols. Nigel Williams reports.
Token values
Sciences in Rome have been looking at whether capuchin monkeys are able to use plastic tokens as symbols of differing food rewards. The experiment involved choices between combinations of tokens A and B, worth one and three rewards respectively.
The researchers, reporting in the Proceedings B of the Royal Society series B (published online), found that when one token B was presented alongside one to five tokens A, four out of the ten monkeys relied on a flexible strategy that allowed them to maximise their total food reward.
"At least some of the capuchins maximised their pay-off by using tokens as symbols," the authors write. "To do so, they made complex reasoning on token quantities and flexibly combined them."
Calculating: New results suggest some capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) can maximise their food reward from offered tokens of different value. (Picture: Manfred Pfefferle/Photolibrary.)
